Abstract: While traditional equitable analysis requires the balancing of harms to affected parties and the assessment of the public interest when considering preliminary injunctive relief, courts have largely declined to do so in Endangered Species Act litigation. This unique approach stems from the Supreme Court's landmark 1978 Endangered Species Act decision, TVA v. Hill. More recent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest that TVA should not be read so broadly, and that the traditional approach to preliminary injunctions offers no exception. This article examines the development of the TVA preliminary injunctive relief approach in the lower courts. It then discusses why this approach is inapplicable when plaintiffs in Endangered Species Act cases seek to enjoin non-federal actors. The inapplicability of TVA's injunctive relief standard to non-federal actors is based on TVA itself as well as recent Supreme Court decisions that have emphasized the importance of traditional equitable principles. As a matter of policy, this article also discusses why the balancing of harms and consideration of public interest for non-federal actors offers a more sensible approach for property owners as well as for endangered species.
Introduction
Faced with an Endangered Species Act lawsuit, 2 the cost of complying with a citizen plaintiff's 3 demands is no doubt one of the first things that come to a defendant's mind. 4 And * Staff Attorney, Environmental Practice Group, Pacific Legal Foundation. The views expressed in this Article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Pacific Legal Foundation. 3 Section 11(g) of the Endangered Species Act provides that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or entity . . . who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this Act or regulation issued under the authority thereof." 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). "Person" is defined to include "an individual, corporation, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity," as well as "any officer, employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State" and "any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State." Id. § 1532(C)(13). See also TVA, 437 U.S. at 180-8 ("Citizen involvement was encouraged by the Act, with provisions allowing interested persons to petition the Secretary to list foreclosed in ESA preliminary injunctive relief cases. 7 Under this argument, language within the Supreme Court's landmark ESA decision, TVA v. Hill, 8 prevents courts from using traditional equitable discretion in ESA cases and mandates that the public interest always favors the imposition of an injunction. 9 For example, the Ninth Circuit has cited TVA in holding that "the 'language, history, and structure' of the ESA demonstrates Congress'
determination that the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected species." 10 However, it is far from clear that TVA's instruction that the ESA should be used "to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost" 11 applies to anything but the limited facts of that case. 12 Moreover, such a mandate stands in sharp contrast to the courts must balance the equities and factor in public interest considerations when fashioning preliminary injunctive relief. 14 These assessments are important hallmarks of preliminary injunctive relief and may not be considered "in only a cursory fashion," 15 even when a movant seeks to protect ecological, scientific, and recreational interests, such as the prevention of injury to marine mammals. 16 While Winter arose under the National Environmental Policy Act, 17 the decision reaffirmed traditional notions of equity 18 and held that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary 14 Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374. See also Jonathan Cannon, Environmentalism and the Supreme Court: A Cultural Analysis, 33 Ecology L.Q. 363, 413-414 (2006) ("At least since the onset of the industrial revolution, equity rules have required that in issuing an injunction a court must not only consider the irreparability of harm to the plaintiff and the adequacy of legal remedies but must also undertake a 'balancing of the utilities.' The court weighs the interests of the parties and makes an assessment of the overall public interest. Consideration of the costs of injunctive relief as well as the benefits advance's equity's purpose to ensure reason and justice in particular cases."). 15 Id. at 377. 16 See id. at 377-78. 17 At issue in Winter was a district court's injunction of the Navy's sonar training exercises off the coast of southern California. Specifically, the district court enjoined the Navy to shut down the military training exercises upon spotting a marine mammal within 2,200 yards of a vessel. Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 373. Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit held that a preliminary injunction was appropriate given in part the likelihood that the Navy had violated the NEPA by failing to prepare an environmental impact statement for the training exercises. See id. at 374-75. NEPA requires in part that federal agencies "to the fullest extent possible" prepare an environmental impact statement for "every . . . major Federal action [n] significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). While the Court's opinion noted that likelihood of success on the merits is one requirement for a preliminary injunction, its analysis dealt mainly with the latter three parts of the test for preliminary injunctive relief: likelihood of irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, the balance of hardships, and public interest considerations. See Winter, 129 S.Ct. at 374-82 ("[W]e do not address the underlying merits' of plaintiffs' claims.").
18
A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each case, courts 'must balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief.' 'In exercising their sound discretion, courts of equity should pay particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of an injunction.' Circuit noted that, although the circumstances in Coxe and Burlington Northern required that the endangered species be given "the utmost consideration, we do not think that they can blindly compel our decision in this case because the harm asserted by the Navy implicates national security and therefore deserves greater weight than the economic harm" in Coxe and
Burlington Northern. 79 Likewise, "the effect of a preliminary injunction on the public interest is directly tied to its impact on both military preparedness and the endangered and threatened species," 80 so that "the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the public interest weighed in favor of denying a preliminary injunction." (2003) ("It is difficult for attorneys to counsel their clients and predict the way a judge may rule when the legal principles on which the court must base its discretion are unclear, ambiguous, and rife with contradiction. The most the attorney can predict is that the judge will apply the principles of the circuit in which the case is pending.").
District of Florida was asked to preliminarily enjoin the enforcement of a county and beachfront illumination ordinance as well as to enjoin Volusia County from permitting vehicles on its beaches at night, in order to protect Loggerhead sea turtles and Green sea turtles. 94 The county argued that the court should consider "the devastating effect" an injunction would have on the county. 95 The court declined to do so, holding that the 108 Id. at 897. At the beginning of his memorandum opinion and order, Judge Sparks poetically opined his displeasure that a suit had been brought to cease the cleaning of Barton Springs, "a true Austin shrine, A hundred years of swimming sublime . . . today, Austin's citizens get away with a rhyme; But, the truth is, they might not be so lucky next time. The Endangered Species Act in its extreme makes no sense. Only Congress can change it to make this problem past tense." Id. at 888.
As the foregoing demonstrates, the lower courts' abandonment of traditional equitable principles when considering preliminary injunctive relief against non-federal actors stems from the Ninth Circuit's holding that "the balance of hardships and the public interest tips heavily in favor of protected species." 109 This holding, in turn, is based on TVA's admonition that endangered species are to be afforded "the highest of priorities."
110
The point of TVA, however, was not to establish the ESA as a super-statute that triumphs over traditional notions of equity in each and every circumstance. 113 Id. 114 See, e.g., TVA, 437 U.S. at 172 ("One would be hard pressed to find a statutory provision whose terms were any plainer than those in § 7 of the Endangered Species Act.) and at 185 (noting that "the While it is true that Chief Justice Burger wrote that "the balance has been struck in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities," 115 this prioritization was meant to address the unique legal issue of TVA: "whether the Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires a court to enjoin the operation of a virtually completed federal dam . . . .
[which] would eradicate an endangered species.
116
Although the decision is filled with majestic language, little was said as to how courts should balance the equities when faced with a non-federal defendant. 117 If this decision was legislative history undergirding § 7 reveals an explicit congressional direction to require agencies to afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species" as well as "a conscious decisions by Congress to give endangered species priority over the 'primary missions' of federal agencies"). See also Cannon, supra note 101 at 417 ("The Court's analysis is tightly focused on ascribing congressional intent in establishing the priority for speceies in Section 7."). 1963, 1989-1992 (2006) . One week after the decision was issued, Stevens wrote "I am inclined to think . . . that the kind of policy choices that are inevitably involved can usually be handled more effectively by a legislative, executive, or administrative body. A central point of the Chief Justice's fine opinion in the snail darter case was that the underlying issue was not one that we could decide." Id. at 1991 (quoting Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Kenneth A. Manaster (June 23, 1978)) (on file with Professor Manaster). Given Justice Stevens' preference for legislative, executive, and administrative bodies to make difficult environmental policy decisions, it seems odd that he had little trouble with enjoining TVA's attempt to complete Tellico Dam; given the decision to enjoin the dam project, it seems likewise odd that Justice Stevens believed that the Court was not deciding the underlying issue. Cf. TVA, 437 U.S. at 172 ("It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of species extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually completed dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 million. The paradox is not minimized by the fact that Congress continued to appropriate large sums of public money for the project, even after congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of its apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter.").
meant to divest federal courts of their traditional equity jurisdiction in each and every circumstance, one would expect this result to be based on more than just dicta. Although Burlington Northern and its progeny hold otherwise, TVA is silent, or at the very least ambiguous, as to whether its analysis and emphasis on protecting endangered species "whatever the cost" are applicable to non-federal actors. Until there is further direction either from Congress or the Supreme Court itself on ESA preliminary injunctive relief against non-federal actors, courts should narrowly interpret TVA by the traditional balancing of harms and consideration of the public interest.
C. Applying the Traditional Injunctive Relief Standards to Non-Federal Actors Under the Endangered Species Act: Better for Property Owners, Better for Species
For property owners, the Endangered Species Act is a major concern. 149 Under Section 9, landowners are prohibited from "taking" listed species. 150 Under this provision, not only is it illegal for landowners not only for landowners to take endangered species as the term "take" has historically been understood, but they must also they prevent any harm to listed species, including making changes to species' habitat. 151 This broad proscription can often pose a significant hurdle in landowners' ability to make beneficial use their property. 152 perverse incentive for non-federal actors to protect endangered species and will not be as likely to result in non-federal actors withholding pertinent information on endangered species.
162

IV. Conclusion
Several courts have held that the equitable traditions of balancing the parties' harms and considering the public interest have no place when it comes to preliminary injunctions under the ESA. Yet, as the case from which this principle is derived is a narrow one, so too should the principle itself be limited. Courts that apply TVA v. Hill's injunctive relief standard to preliminary injunctions against non-federal actors read TVA still broadly. They should instead more fully examine the limited circumstances of TVA and note how the Court has recently limited the application of TVA. Moreover, courts should restore equitable tradition in ESA preliminary injunctive relief cases against non-federal actors because the Supreme Court has affirmed the traditional approach to preliminary injunctive relief and because doing so would better reflect the relationship between the statutory protection afforded to endangered species and the constitutional protection afforded to property rights.
